A little late on this report, but here are some Python runtime bugs I found back in May 2007:
http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2008-008.html
Nothing too interesting. It continues to illustrate that modules backed by native code are a great way to break out of a VM. Also, image manipulation code remains a hot spot for integer overflows.
The pickle bug is worth talking about. It has been known for trusted applications to unpickle untrusted data. Of course, any such application invites arbitrary Python code execution unless the pickled buffer is very carefully sanitized; Python pickle buffers can carry Python executable payloads. Assuming an application avoids this more egregious security bug, this is a nasty subtlety. Along with the string concatenation bug, it's a way an attacker could directly attack a trusted application written in an allegedly memory-safe language.
Whilst testing out the pickle bug, I was seeing a very interesting glibc interaction:
*** glibc detected *** ./python: munmap_chunk(): invalid pointer: 0x0819e9a8
Segmentation fault
Unfortunately, my laptop with the magic glibc / gcc versions to reproduce this died horribly and I can't even remember what it was running. Anyway, these messages suggest that the glibc memory error handler is trusting the heap rather than "getting the hell out" by using write(stderr, ...) and kill(getpid(), SIGABRT). This can sometimes turn an unexploitable condition into an exploitable one. If you're interested in looking into this, let me know and I can try and help with the test environment.
Monday, October 20, 2008
Saturday, August 30, 2008
Cross-domain leaks of site logins
Browsers suck. We're building our fortified web apps on foundations of sand. A little while back, I was talking with Jeremiah about an interesting attack he had to determine whether a user is logged into a given site or not. The attack relies on the target site hosting an image at a known URL for authenticated users only. It proceeds by abusing a generic browser cross-domain leak of whether an image exists or not -- via the
My version of this "login determination" attack is to abuse another leaky area of browser cross-domain handling: CSS. The
If you are logged in, you'll see "3px" vs. "0px" otherwise.
You'll also appreciate from this that any CSS property value is stealable cross-domain, assuming the style names aren't randomized (which I've never seen). The natural follow-up question is, are sensitive values stored in CSS properties? Currently, generally not, although I have seen
onload vs. onerror javascript events. Browsers generally closed that leak for local filesystem URLs (thus preventing accurate profiling of a victim's machine) but neglected to close it generally.My version of this "login determination" attack is to abuse another leaky area of browser cross-domain handling: CSS. The
<link> tag permits us to load CSS resource from arbitrary domains. The two interesting observations here are that we can read arbitrary CSS property values if we know the name of the style plus the property name we are interesting in. Secondly, most websites serve different CSS depending on whether the user is logged in or not. In addition, remember that browsers will happily pluck inline style definitions out of HTML. Put these things together, and here's a FF3.0.1 snippet that will tell if you are logged into MySpace or not:
<html>
<head>
<link rel="stylesheet"
href="http://home.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user"/>
<script>
function func() {
var ele = document.getElementById('blah');
alert(window.getComputedStyle(ele, null).getPropertyValue('margin-bottom'));
}
</script>
</head>
<body onload="func()">
<div id="blah" class="show">
</body>
</html>
If you are logged in, you'll see "3px" vs. "0px" otherwise.
You'll also appreciate from this that any CSS property value is stealable cross-domain, assuming the style names aren't randomized (which I've never seen). The natural follow-up question is, are sensitive values stored in CSS properties? Currently, generally not, although I have seen
background-url storing look & feel customization which could assist fingerprinting a user. In a couple of extreme cases, I've seen background-url used with a data: URI such as . Might be worth stealing.
Friday, August 29, 2008
Ode to the bug that almost was
This post is a tribute to the hundreds of bugs that never quite were serious, and the emotional roller coaster ride on which they take researchers.
Some brief background. The skill in finding serious bugs these days isn't in being a demon code auditor or a furious fuzzer; there are thousands of these. The skill lies instead in finding a piece of software, or a piece of functionality, that has the curious mix of being important yet not having seen much scrutiny.
Onto today's almost-bug: an interesting integer condition in the ZIP parser of Sun's JDK. The ZIP parser is a critical piece of code because not only is it used to parse JARs, but also server-side Java applications will often parse untrusted ZIPs. (Such direct server-side attacks, along the lines of my JDK ICC parser vulnerabilities last year, are nasty, and starting to recently become in-vogue for Python, Ruby and Perl too). The affected API is
The interesting code, in zip_util.c follows:
So why does this appear to be just a bug and not a security vulnerability? Well, on systems without
The same sign-extension bug exists in other parts of the ZIP handling, and leads to some interesting negative values getting to some interesting places. But lower-level sanity checks save the day in the cases that I could find.
A zip file capable of triggering the interesting log line "mmap failed for CEN and END part of zip file" is available at http://scary.beasts.org/misc/mmap_fail.zip.
Ah well, maybe next time. Come to thing of it, my pipeline does include real JDK vulns. Watch this space.
Some brief background. The skill in finding serious bugs these days isn't in being a demon code auditor or a furious fuzzer; there are thousands of these. The skill lies instead in finding a piece of software, or a piece of functionality, that has the curious mix of being important yet not having seen much scrutiny.
Onto today's almost-bug: an interesting integer condition in the ZIP parser of Sun's JDK. The ZIP parser is a critical piece of code because not only is it used to parse JARs, but also server-side Java applications will often parse untrusted ZIPs. (Such direct server-side attacks, along the lines of my JDK ICC parser vulnerabilities last year, are nasty, and starting to recently become in-vogue for Python, Ruby and Perl too). The affected API is
java.util.zip.ZipFile. Best I know, java.util.zip.ZipInputStream is not backed by the same native code, and thereby unaffected.The interesting code, in zip_util.c follows:
/* Following are unsigned 32-bit */
jlong endpos, cenpos, cenlen;
...
/* Get position and length of central directory */
cenlen = ENDSIZ(endbuf);
if (cenlen > endpos)
ZIP_FORMAT_ERROR("invalid END header (bad central directory size)");
cenpos = endpos - cenlen;
jlong is a signed 64-bit type. The ENDSIZ macro, because of the way it is formulated, returned a signed int. Therefore, the assignment to cenlen triggers sign extension. This means that cenlen can end up being negative, rather than the stated intent of being treated as an unsigned 32-bit quantity. The negative value will of course bypass the security check and lead to subsequent undesirable state. (Note that the best fix is not to enhance the check, but to add a cast to unsigned int to the underlying macro as it is used in multiple places).So why does this appear to be just a bug and not a security vulnerability? Well, on systems without
mmap(), a huge allocation will either cleanly fail, or a read() attempt past EOF will cleanly fail. On systems with mmap(), things are more interesting. A 32-bit build will attempt a 2Gb large mapping on a potentially much smaller file. This could lead to interesting SIGBUS conditions as a server DoS. By quite some luck, the Sun JVM process seems to spray mappings liberally through the address space, leaving no room for a contiguous 2Gb mapping.The same sign-extension bug exists in other parts of the ZIP handling, and leads to some interesting negative values getting to some interesting places. But lower-level sanity checks save the day in the cases that I could find.
A zip file capable of triggering the interesting log line "mmap failed for CEN and END part of zip file" is available at http://scary.beasts.org/misc/mmap_fail.zip.
Ah well, maybe next time. Come to thing of it, my pipeline does include real JDK vulns. Watch this space.
Monday, August 25, 2008
A dangerous combination of browser features
As browsers gain more and more features, the possibility increases for interesting or dangerous interactions between these features. I was recently playing with a couple of new browser features -- <canvas> and SVGs -- and found a cross-domain leak in the development version of Webkit:
http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2008-007.html
Fortunately, no production versions of the major browsers are affected - and forearmed with this information, they can keep it that way. The only production browser I found that supports all of the required pieces is Opera 9.52, and they deserve some serious credit for getting the security check correct.
http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2008-007.html
Fortunately, no production versions of the major browsers are affected - and forearmed with this information, they can keep it that way. The only production browser I found that supports all of the required pieces is Opera 9.52, and they deserve some serious credit for getting the security check correct.
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Buffer overflow in libxslt
libxslt is an interesting attack surface; there are various places in which it is used to process untrusted stylesheets. This includes some browsers, although namespace issues seem to prevent the affected code from being reached in a browser context.
Within libxslt itself, there are some built-in functions. These are usually a fruitful place to look for vulnerabilities, particularly those that take integers etc. In this instance, I found problems in a little used cryptography related extension function. An incoming string is over-trusted in that its length is not sanitized, leading to a heap overflow.
XSLT, surprisingly, is turing-complete, even in its currently deployed incarnations (although you need to implement looping via recursion). There may be interesting DoS and further exploitation opportunities here.
Full technical details can be found here:
http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2008-003.html
Within libxslt itself, there are some built-in functions. These are usually a fruitful place to look for vulnerabilities, particularly those that take integers etc. In this instance, I found problems in a little used cryptography related extension function. An incoming string is over-trusted in that its length is not sanitized, leading to a heap overflow.
XSLT, surprisingly, is turing-complete, even in its currently deployed incarnations (although you need to implement looping via recursion). There may be interesting DoS and further exploitation opportunities here.
Full technical details can be found here:
http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2008-003.html
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
On FTP, SSL and broken interfaces
Oh what a fun day I just had piecing together a few SSL changes for vsftpd!
Let's start with a brief background on SSL. SSL provides not just secrecy but also integrity - an attacker cannot change your data stream in flight. This includes obviously changing data in the stream, and less obviously, truncating the stream. The interesting attack to truncate the stream is to fake a TCP packet with FIN set. Truncated data is still an integrity violation and could have interesting consequences depending on what is being transferred. Anyway, as of SSLv3 and newer, the protocol protects against this. So, we're all good right?
Well, no, not really. Let's look at how SSL_read() indicates a problem. We all know how read() behaves, of course. It returns 0 on a healthy EOF. SSL_read() does the same on a healthy, cryptographically guaranteed EOF. But what does it do it if the attacker forces the TCP stream to close with a faked FIN? It also returns 0. That's right - no indication of any problem at the API level. If you want to check what is going on, you need to either check the SSL error code, in case there is one, or call SSL_get_shutdown(). (This double option in itself leads to confusion and random variance in code, which isn't great but that's another topic).
The OpenSSL API for SSL_read() is broken. You can phrase why in various ways: it violates the principle of least surprise. Or, perhaps best said, it provides an API that is easy to abuse. Good, secure APIs are hard to abuse. Contrast strcat() with string::operator+=() for the classic example.
A quick survey of popular FTP servers reveals that they universally fail to check for this condition when accepting an SSL secured upload. vsftpd v2.0.7 now optionally checks for this condition but it is off by default! Why? The majority of FTP clients have an interoperability bug in that they don't SSL_shutdown() their uploads. It's a direct knock-on from the SSL_read() broken API. If it returned error on forced connection shutdown, then FTP servers wouldn't have ever tolerated buggy clients, and clients would have been forced to correctly shutdown their connections.
Thanks to Tim Kosse of FileZilla fame for putting me on to this area by checking for secure connection shutdown in the latest version of FileZilla, exposing an interoperability bug in vsftpd's SSL downloads.
Let's start with a brief background on SSL. SSL provides not just secrecy but also integrity - an attacker cannot change your data stream in flight. This includes obviously changing data in the stream, and less obviously, truncating the stream. The interesting attack to truncate the stream is to fake a TCP packet with FIN set. Truncated data is still an integrity violation and could have interesting consequences depending on what is being transferred. Anyway, as of SSLv3 and newer, the protocol protects against this. So, we're all good right?
Well, no, not really. Let's look at how SSL_read() indicates a problem. We all know how read() behaves, of course. It returns 0 on a healthy EOF. SSL_read() does the same on a healthy, cryptographically guaranteed EOF. But what does it do it if the attacker forces the TCP stream to close with a faked FIN? It also returns 0. That's right - no indication of any problem at the API level. If you want to check what is going on, you need to either check the SSL error code, in case there is one, or call SSL_get_shutdown(). (This double option in itself leads to confusion and random variance in code, which isn't great but that's another topic).
The OpenSSL API for SSL_read() is broken. You can phrase why in various ways: it violates the principle of least surprise. Or, perhaps best said, it provides an API that is easy to abuse. Good, secure APIs are hard to abuse. Contrast strcat() with string::operator+=() for the classic example.
A quick survey of popular FTP servers reveals that they universally fail to check for this condition when accepting an SSL secured upload. vsftpd v2.0.7 now optionally checks for this condition but it is off by default! Why? The majority of FTP clients have an interoperability bug in that they don't SSL_shutdown() their uploads. It's a direct knock-on from the SSL_read() broken API. If it returned error on forced connection shutdown, then FTP servers wouldn't have ever tolerated buggy clients, and clients would have been forced to correctly shutdown their connections.
Thanks to Tim Kosse of FileZilla fame for putting me on to this area by checking for secure connection shutdown in the latest version of FileZilla, exposing an interoperability bug in vsftpd's SSL downloads.
Monday, July 14, 2008
Lame OpenOffice PCX crash
Sorry for the lame vuln. It's something I was playing with over a year ago and I just happened to notice it got fixed. I forget what the original deal was. I'm only posting because this blog serves as an RSS feed for the scary.beasts.org main vuln list.
http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2008-006.html
A more interesting OpenOffice observation is in the works.
http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2008-006.html
A more interesting OpenOffice observation is in the works.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)